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An  exhibit  at  the  Smithsonian  Institution  in  Washington  ex-
plores America's  drive for productivity.  The pitfalls as well as  the
benefits of productivity  are emphasized in this walk-through,  multi-
media design.  In several places, this legend  is posted: "If we're so
good,  why aren't we better?"
The  creator  of that exhibit  was  treating  a  broad  spectrum  of
American  effort.  But, that recurring message,  if so good, why not
better,  is  not lost  on  those  dealing  with  public  policy  aspects  of
the  world  food  problem.  Today,  we  are  being called  to account
for  the  recently  unusual  domestic  as  well  as  world  food  mar-
ket-for short supplies  and high  prices.
Agriculture in  the developed countries-if it  is  so  good,  why
do we  have to  pay such high prices  for our food now?
The green revolution in the developing world-if it is so good,
why  are  developing  nations  like  India  still  coming  up  so  short
on food supplies?
If  modern agriculture  is so good, why isn't it better?
Clearly,  currently  tight  world  food  supplies  and  high  prices
have  renewed  controversy  over trade  and  aid  policies.  Conflicts
arise  between  agricultural  trade  designs  of  the  major  economic
powers  and  their  aid  responsibilities.  The  issue  builds  over how
to  assure  a  growing  and  steady  food  supply  for  the  have-not
nations.
Putting these issues into proper perspective requires  more than
a  cursory  look  at  short-run  phenomena  such  as  the  latest  price
of  soybeans  or  crop  shortfalls  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Too  often,
the short-term  world food situation is confused with the long-term,
the past with the present,  or facts with speculation.  My discussion
of the  world  food  situation  will  center  around  four obvious,  but
distinct, time frames-the  long-term past, the immediate past,  the
immediate future,  and the long-term future.
LONG-TERM  PAST
The world's  long-term  record  reflects  a very  stable  and  rising
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sion,  per capita food production has risen.
Since  1954,  per  capita  food  production  in  developed  regions
has  increased  about  1.5  percent  annually.  The  less  developed
regions-except for Africa-experienced  a much slower,  yet posi-
tive,  change  in  food  production-about  0.5  percent  a  year.
Although  both  regions  had  about  the  same  percentage  increase
in  total production,  the greater increase  in population  cut the per
capita rate of gain  in the less developed world.
But,  our statistics  on changes  in food  output  tell only  part of
the story.  Poverty, poor food distribution,  eating habits,  and many
other  special  circumstances  mean  that  large  groups  of people  in
the  less  developed  world,  as  well  as  the  developed  world,  have
been poorly nourished.
Despite  this,  the world  is  improving  its  food  supply.  That  is
one  basic  fact  underpinning  our  later discussion  of more  recent,
albeit unhappier,  events.  Another basic  fact  in the  food situation
is  that the  world  as  a whole-not just the  United  States,  Japan,
or Europe-is becoming more  affluent.
Again, just  as  there  are  food  supply  trouble  spots,  there  are
economic  problems  as  well.  But,  both  developed  and  less
developed  nations  have  achieved  per capita  economic  growth  of
at least 3 to  4 percent  a year.  The  U.S.  per capita  gross national
product has increased  40 percent since  1960.  Japan's  has tripled.
South Korea's has doubled.
We  are  talking  about  buying  power,  and  that  buying  power
has  triggered  a  protein  revolution.  People  with  more  money  buy
more  animal  protein-milk,  eggs,  and  meat.  This  is  a  far  more
expensive diet than one based  on cereals.  American consumption
of animal products  alone requires that we indirectly use four times
more  cereal  per person  than  many  people  in  the  less  developed
world  consume  directly as their basic  diet.
So,  as incomes  have  accelerated  over the past decade  or two,
greater  stress has been placed on the world's cereal supplies.  This
forms  the  backdrop  for  the  confusing  agricultural  events  of the
past two years.
IMMEDIATE  PAST
Today's  shortages of beef in the supermarkets,  $5 wheat, soy-
beans that exceeded  $12 on  the Chicago  futures,  U.S.  1973  food
prices  likely  to  average  20  percent  above  1972  levels,  U.S.  per
capita food  consumption down for the first time since  1965-these
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result of an equally extraordinary combination  of international  cir-
cumstances  involving  changes  in  currency  values,  short  grain
crops,  and massive  purchases  on the world  grain market.
These worldwide conditions have helped push the value of U.S.
agricultural  exports  up from  $8.1  billion in  fiscal  year  (FY)  1972
to $12.9  billion in FY  1973.  The acceleration  of U.S. farm exports
has contributed  solidly to a turnaround in our balance of payments
(BOP)  position. Just  recently,  we  learned  that the  United  States
posted  a  $463  million  surplus  in  its  BOP  position  in  the  fourth
quarter of FY  1973  when measured  by the number of dollars held
by  foreign  central  banks.  This  is  a  change  from  a  $10.5  billion
deficit  in the prior quarter.  When measured  by  the number of dol-
lars  held  by  foreign commercial  banks  as  well  as central  banks,
we  had  a deficit,  but  it was  considerably  smaller than the  deficit
we  had  on  this  basis  in  the  last  quarter.  FY  1974  farm  export
levels are  expected  to  expand  significantly,  although  controversy
is building over  the question  of export controls.
Devaluation
One of the important factors  affecting  the U.S.  food  situation
has  been  the  devaluation  of the dollar.  In  the last two years,  the
dollar has been  devalued  by  about  12.8 percent.  This  change  was
brought  about  by  two formal  currency  realignments  and a  down-
ward  float  by the  dollar  since  March of this year.
The effect  of this  devaluation  has  been a lowering  of the price
of  U.S.  exports  in  terms  of foreign  currencies  or,  if  you  will,
foreign  nations  have been  given  some discount coupons for shop-
ping in the United  States.
The  12.8  percent  devaluation  is just  an  average.  The  dollar
has devalued  relative  to  the Japanese  yen,  for instance,  by  some
27 percent  in  the last two years.  Significantly,  Japan  is  the  single
largest importer  of U.S.  farm goods ($1.4  billion last year,  maybe
$2  billion  this  year)  and  has  found  the  devaluations  to  be  to  its
advantage  in  U.S.  purchases.  Relative  to  the  German  mark,  the
dollar  has devalued  by  33  percent.  The  dollar  has  also devalued
by  19  percent relative  to the French franc,  and 20 percent  relative
to the Dutch guilder.
The  overall  effect  of the  U.S.  dollar devaluations  as  well  as
tight  world  grain  stocks  and  short  crops  has  been  a  build-up  in
foreign  demand  for  U.S.  agricultural  products,  mainly  soybeans
and feed  grains.
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The impact of devaluation on current food  demand and prices,
while  significant,  has been  far overshadowed  by an overwhelming
shortfall  in  food  production in large areas of the world.  Total and
per  capita  food  production  declined  in  both  developed  regions
(North America,  Europe, USSR, Japan, Republic of South Africa,
Australia,  and  New  Zealand)  and  less  developed  regions  in  1972
(Figure  1).  Each  of the four major  less developed  regions  (South
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FIGURE  1. Indices of food production  in the  developed  and less  developed  coun-
tries.  (Source:  Economic  Research  Service,  U.S.  Department of Agriculture.)
112America;  and Africa,  excluding the Republic of South Africa)  ex-
perienced  severe  declines  in per capita production.
Specifically  in  1972:  Winter-kill  and  then  a  dry  summer  cut
the Soviet grain crop. Drought crippled grain production in Argen-
tina and Australia.  A below-normal  monsoon dashed India's grain
crop  expectations.  Drought  and  typhoons  slashed  the  Philippine
rice  and  corn  crops.  The  U.S.  corn  and  soybean  harvest  was
stalled  by  wet field  conditions.  Peru's anchovy  catch failed,  thus
cutting  high  protein  fishmeal  production.  The  African  Sahel
nations  of  Mauritania,  Mali,  Chad,  Senegal,  Upper  Volta,  and
Niger suffered  their fifth consecutive  year of severe  drought.  The
Southeast Asian rice crop fell victim to bad weather. These events,
in combination,  placed  an unusually  critical  strain  on world  grain
supplies.
Soviet  Purchases
After the  severe  shortfall  in their grain crop,  the Soviets came
to  the  world market  for almost  28  million  tons  of cereals,  about
18  million of them from the United  States. These  grain purchases
from the United States  totaled  $802  million for those grains deliv-
ered in FY  1973 ($147  million  in FY  1972).  Not all of the USSR's
total cereal purchases have yet been shipped.  Some, like the wheat
purchased from Canada,  was redirected to other centrally  planned
nations. The Soviets imported only about 20 million tons last year.
What  made  the  Soviet  purchases  so  surprising  was  that they
represented  a major reversal  in Soviet  food supply  policy.  Tradi-
tionally, the Soviets have reacted  to short supplies by simply tight-
ening their belts and waiting out the shortage.  A normal adjustment
for them, among  others,  has been  large livestock  slaughter.  Even
though  they  did  import  wheat  in  1963  and  1965,  the  Soviets  still
slaughtered  large  numbers  of livestock.  But  not  in  1972;  instead
they wielded their purchasing power quite forcefully  in what might
have  been  a  domestic  political  decision  to  maintain  diets  and
expand  livestock numbers  in the  face  of domestic  shortages.
The Soviet purchases,  combined with the opening of trade with
the  People's  Republic  of China  ($207  million  in  FY  1973)  and
trade expansion  with Eastern Europe,  pushed our total farm  sales
to communist countries in FY 1973 to around $1.5 billion,  a fivefold
increase  over FY  1972.
Overall Exports
While  the  Soviet  purchases  have  received  the  lion's  share  of
attention,  they by  no  means  accounted  for the greater portion  of
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jumped  60  percent;  40  percent  of this  was  due  to  higher  prices.
But,  the  USSR  accounted  for  only  16  percent  of that  increase
compared  to  30  percent  for Western  Europe  and  22  percent  for
Japan.
The  net  result  of the  short  crops  and  expanded  trade  with
Europe,  Japan,  China,  and  the  USSR  was  a  tremendous  surge
in  world  grain  exports  in  1972-a one-fifth  increase  of about  24
million  tons.  Since  1972  production  was  short,  this  accelerated
import  demand  had  to  be  met  through  stock  draw-downs.  We,
alone,  increased  our grain  exports  by  30 million tons,  or 6 million
more than  the worldwide  increase  in  exports.  We,  therefore,  not
only covered the total jump in exports but also the  large shortfalls
experienced  by other exporting nations.
So, that  was the year that was.
The  world  grain  market  became  very  much  the  province  of
the  wealthy  nations who could  afford  the prices.
The  less  developed  nations  like  India,  with  severe  foreign
exchange  limitations,  needed  more  grain  and  had  to  pay  much
more  for  it.  Moreover,  despite  the  solid  technological  advances
of the green revolution,  the  weather once  again showed  its ability
to overwhelm the  yield potential  of new technology  and improved
management.  Famine, last feared  on a major scale  in  India during
the  mid-1960's,  is  threatening  anew  in  Africa.
The  United States  ended the  fiscal year with  the lowest stock
of grain  since  1952.  A  controversy  on export  controls,  to  protect
against  anticipated  high demand  for our short supplies,  was born.
Controls  were,  in fact,  placed  on soybeans.
Long-term  growth  in  world  affluence,  currency  realignment,
poor crops,  and unusual  world grain  purchases  have  shaved grain
stocks and  generated  high prices  throughout the  world.
Foremost  in our minds  now is the  question:  Will  the year that
was  continue into  the  year that  will be?
IMMEDIATE  FUTURE
The  immediate  future  will  be  shaped  mainly  by  the  weather,
but devaluation  will remain  a factor.
Supplies
In  general,  crops  in  the  United  States  and  around  the  world
look  bigger  this  year.  With  the  relatively  low  carryover  in  U.S.
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tion  a  bit  more  keenly  on  the  USDA  monthly  crop  report.  The
September  issue  noted a 4  percent boost  in corn production over
last year; increased  soybean  acreage  with record high production,
some 25 percent above last  year; and wheat  production  12 percent
above  a  year  ago.  Despite  this  and  due  to  expected  continued
strong demand,  supplies  will still be tight (with  lower than normal
stocks)  and prices  will  stay high.
For the rest of the world, production prospects also look better,
although  the situation  in many  less  developed  regions  still  looks
bad,  mainly  because of weather.
Weather  conditions  have  improved  in  the  Soviet  Union  and
the  1973  Soviet  wheat  crop  will  probably  register  between  last
year's poor crop and the  1970 and  1971 bumper crops. Feed grains,
too,  look  good.  It appears  as  if the  Soviets  will  be  able  to  meet
domestic  needs  from their  own  production  and  from  the imports
being  received.  Also,  they  will  likely  be  able  to  partially  rebuild
stocks.  Best estimates  show that the Soviet Union will only import
about half as  much grain  in FY  1974  as in FY  1973.
China's wheat  prospects,  bolstered by expanded winter  wheat
plantings,  look  generally favorable.
The  Australian  drought has  broken  and feed  grain production
will likely be up.
Argentina's  wheat  production  will  likely  be  depressed  by
excessive  rain which  occurred  at planting  time.
India's  grain  situation  is  less  certain.  Their  1973  wheat  crop
harvested  in  March  and  April  matched  last  year's  record.  But,
the drought had enough impact on rice and coarse grains to depress
total grain production for the  year ending April  1. While  the mon-
soon looks good,  heavy flooding  has recently  destroyed  large por-
tions  of the  fall  harvest.  Weather,  again,  is  very  much  a  factor
for  India  as  well  as  Pakistan,  also  severely  damaged  by  recent
flooding.  Prices  on the  world market  will  influence  very  critically
India's import designs.
There  have  been  rains  in  Africa's  Sahel,  but  the  situation
remains  grave.  Livestock  losses  have  been  particularly  severe,
something  like  80 percent  in  Chad and  Mauritania  and  an  almost
completely  devastating  95  percent  in  Mali,  according  to  news
accounts.
Weather  is  still  very much  the  question  throughout  Southeast
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monsoon.
Larger feed grain and wheat acreages  point to expanded Cana-
dian production.
Overall,  USDA  looks  for  world  grain  production  to  increase
over 50 million tons this year.  Any price optimism over this, how-
ever, has to be balanced against  a continuing  high demand  as well
as  reduced  stocks.  Even  with  the  production  advance,  world
stocks  of food  grains  and  feed  grains  at  the end  of 1973-74  may
be below  last year's  levels.
Devaluation
The  dollar  devaluation  will  soften  the  impact  of  high  U.S.
prices  in  some  foreign  markets.  For  example,  the  fact  that  the
yen appreciated  27 percent against the dollar means  that the Japa-
nese  government  can  get  a  27  percent  discount  on  our  wheat
prices.  So,  despite  the  high  and  rising  U.S.  price  levels  of such
commodities  as wheat and soybeans, they will likely remain  a rela-
tively  attractive  buy in some  foreign markets.
The  effect of devaluation  has  been  to  lower the  price of U.S.
farm  exports  in  terms  of  some  foreign  currencies.  Forty-seven
nations devalued with the United States,  and prices for U.S. com-
modities  did  not  change  in  these  nations.  About  a  third  of our
exports  go  to  such  nations.  However,  about  64  percent  of our
exports  go  to the  62  nations  that permitted  the  dollar to  devalue.
Discounting  the  effects  of  P.L.  480  exports  and  the  33  percent
of our exports  hampered  by  nontariff barriers,  we  find that about
a net 43 percent of our exports go to nations that are free to benefit
from dollar devaluation.  Such savings could be passed on to foreign
consumers  and  could  possibly  generate  higher  demand  for  our
exports.
Devaluation  even  stimulates  farm  exports  to  countries  where
imports  are  controlled  by  state  trading  agencies,  as  in Japan and
India.  Although  the  savings  may not be passed on to the ultimate
consumer,  they  nonetheless  affect  the  costs  seen  by  the  finance
minister and the import monopolies.  They can  recognize  a bargain
as  well  as  the  next  fellow.  Thus,  the  impact  of devaluation  can
be  quite  extensive.  The  pull of foreign  markets  for our  grain  will
be strengthened  by the devaluations  and will contribute to a tight-
ening U.S.  supply  situation.
On  balance,  for the immediate  future,  it appears  that,  despite
generally favorable crop prospects in the more developed  regions,
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importers and the food-short nations, will remain high on the world
market,  especially  for feed grains  and oilseeds.  Currency  realign-
ments will add to that demand,  and will serve to keep U.S. supplies
of grain  tight.  And  prices  will remain  high.
LONG-TERM  FUTURE
At least three  sets of conditions contribute  to the fantastically
high level of U.S.  exports.
One  set  involves  the steady  growth  in  worldwide  demand  for
feed grains  and  other feeds  as  various nations  build up their  live-
stock economies.  The United  States  is clearly  in the driver's  seat
in satisfying this demand, which will contribute solidly to our long-
term growth  in exports.
The  second  set  is  dollar  devaluation.  Little  is  known  about
the time  gap  between  devaluation  and  the desired  effects  of this
action  on  a  nation's  exports.  Some  economists  say  it  happens
rather quickly  and some  say it  may take five years.  Whatever the
interval,  the devaluation  is  expected  to exert  an upward  push  on
our exports  for  the next  few  years.  At some  point,  its  influence
will  cease.  Thus,  devaluation  leads  not to  a  bubble  on  the trend
of  our  exports  as  bad  weather  does,  nor  to  a  year-after-year
increase  as  rising  income  does,  but to a once  and for  all upward
shift in  the  level  of exports.
The  third  set  is  characterized  by recent crop  shortfalls  which
have  contributed  to  a  sizable  bubble  on  top  of the  steadily  up-
trending  exports.  This  bubble  will  likely  dissipate  over  the  next
year  or two  if weather  improves  and  as  production  around  the
world responds  to  the currently  high prices.
There  are  two ERS  projections  of total U.S.  exports  to  1985.
Both  projections  assume  long-term,  steady  growth  in  world
demand  for  livestock  feeds.  A  moderate  projection,  showing
export  volumes  rising 46  percent  above  1970  levels  (or 7 percent
above  currently  high  levels),  is  based  on  the  assumption  that
importing countries  will  pursue  self-sufficiency  policies,  and high
prices  will constrain  import demand  in these  countries.
A higher projection to  1985  of a 70 percent increase  in  volume
above  1970 (or 25 percent above FY  1973) assumes that encourage-
ment  of animal  production  in  importing  countries  will  result  in
a high demand  for feed grains  and high-protein  meal.  This reflects
a  strong,  steady  growth  in  our exports,  but  without  the  current
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tions  of the  world market.
Alternative 1, or the lower projection, reflects a relatively mod-
erate  growth in U.S. exports of feed grains,  even though consumer
incomes  will  continue  to  grow  and  contribute  to  a  demand  for
livestock  products  and  the grain to  produce  them.  The  moderate
level is due to several projected factors: The European Community
would  approach  self-sufficiency  in  meat  and  grains.  Eastern
Europe  and  the  USSR  would  be  close  to  self-sufficiency,  even
though  they  are  now  substantial  importers  of  feed  grains.  The
developing nations would demand only moderate amounts of grain.
In  contrast,  in  spite  of continued  high  prices,  grain  import
demand for Japan  is expected to rise nearly threefold, to 28 million
metric  tons  from  10  million  in  1970.  Taiwan  and  Korea,  both
rapidly  expanding  economies,  would  also  demand  substantial
amounts  of grain.
With moderate growth in import demand,  growth in world grain
production could  exceed the growth  in demand unless major sup-
pliers,  including  the  United  States,  continue  to  produce  at  less
than capacity  at projected  prices.
Alternative 2,  or  the  higher  projection,  would  occur  if:  The
European  Community sets  lower targets  for production  (the  high
cost  of the  high  targets  may  become  politically  infeasible).  The
USSR and  Eastern  Europe  follow  a  policy  to  increase  livestock
consumption  at a faster rate of growth than projected under Alter-
native  1. The  People's  Republic  of China  becomes  more  trade
oriented  and imports  more grain to  improve city diets.
Of course,  imports  by  the  USSR  and  the  People's  Republic
of China  will depend  largely  on  political  decisions  or crop  short-
falls.  They will do all they can to stimulate their own grain produc-
tion.
Larger  demands  for  coarse  grains  would  also  be  expected  if
petroleum-producing  regions  of  Latin  America  and  West  Asia
decide  to  produce  or  import  more  animal  products  in  order  to
upgrade their  diets.  Interestingly,  an  ERS team  in  Iran  is  helping
that nation  to  develop  its livestock  economy.  Iran  is  footing  the
bill of this development  team.
Under the higher projection,  U.S. exports of feed grains could
increase  to  56  million  tons,  or  25  million  tons  higher than under
the  low  projection.  Likewise,  soybean  exports  could  increase  to
1.1  billion bushels,  175  million  above  the  levels  of Alternative  1.
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wheat  exporters  and good  for coarse grain  exporters.  The  differ-
ence  is  due  largely  to  the  rising  demand  for livestock  products,
especially  in the developed  and central plan countries.
The  developed  and  central  plan  countries  will  continue  to  be
the  major  producers  and  consumers  of both  wheat  and  coarse
grains.  The  developed  countries  will  continue  to  supply  the
developing  world  with  grain.  However,  the  developed  importers
will import  more  coarse grain  while the developing  countries  will
import  more wheat.  This  reflects  growing  livestock  economies  in
the developed  world as  well  as the developing  world's preference
to  save  scarce foreign  exchange  for needed food  imports.
ISSUES
Earlier,  the question,  if good,  why  not better,  was posed  con-
cerning two areas, agriculture in the developed world and the green
revolution in  the developing world.
The  question  on  agriculture  in developed  nations  has  already
been at least partially answered. The big culprit is weather. We have
surrounded ourselves with a panoply of technology  which lulled us
into  a  false  sense  of security.  But,  as  we  have  learned  from  the
margarine commercial, it's not nice to fool Mother Nature.  She has
seen her  revenge  and  we  will be  more  conscious  of her  presence
hereafter.
The  question  involving  the  less  developed  countries  centers
on two facets,  their green  revolution  and the responsibility  of the
developed  nations  to  help  improve  the  food  supply  in  the  poor
areas.  Most  especially,  in  times  of food  emergencies  and  high
prices,  like now, what  responsibility  do  the major economic  pow-
ers,  such  as  the  United  States  and  the  USSR,  have  to  the  less
developed  world?
I  am  annoyed  by  critics  who  say  that  the  recent  events  have
proved the  green revolution  has failed.  Many  say that technology
which is  the backbone  of the green  revolution  is  making us  worse
off  by  accelerating  imbalances  in  our  economic  structure,  our
social patterns,  and our relationships  to nature.
The  fact  is  that  the  technology  of the  green  revolution  has
established  a  solid  base  for  agricultural  improvement  in  the  less
developed  nations.  There  are  many  problems,  to  be  sure,  such
as  disease,  inadequate  water  control,  social  inequity,  and  many
others.  But,  instead of backing off in  the  face  of these  problems,
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assistance from the developed  world.
But,  at the same time,  interest in foreign  aid seems  to  be wan-
ing, especially  in the United States,  where our AID program rocks
along  from  congressional  continuing  resolution  to  continuing
resolution. The current funding level for U.S. economic aid stands
at just $1.3 billion compared  with $2.6 billion  in  1961.  The amount
of  economic  aid  from  the  world's  16  major  donors  was  down
3 percent  in  1972.
Just  as  critical  is  the  way  developed  nations  treat  the  less
developed  in the  world markets.  Importing  nations,  including the
less  developed,  have  taken  it  for granted  that the  United  States
would  always  have  enough  grain stocks  to  fill  in  their production
gaps.  But recently  we  have  moved  toward  a  policy  of minimum
stocks  by  adjusting  production  to  anticipated  consumption,  with
less  regard for shortfalls.
Thus,  the  United  States  is  no  longer  a  residual  supplier,  and
unanticipated  demands,  such as from the USSR,  can cause havoc
with prices.  Under  such conditions,  to what  extent will countries
such  as  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  as they  deal  in
the  world market,  take into  account the needs of the  poor nations
such  as  Bangladesh,  India, and those  of Sub-Sahara Africa?
Today,  we  see  a sharp  decline  in  concessional  food  aid  sales
under Title  I  of P.L.  480,  from  $743  million  in  FY  1972  to  $610
million  in  FY  1973.  Because  of a  reduced  budget,  the  expected
FY  1974  level  will  drop  still  further.  In  terms  of  actual  com-
modities,  this  expected  food  aid  level  will  be  even  lower  since
grain  prices  have  almost  doubled.  And,  at  least  one  traditional
food  aid commodity-nonfat  dry milk-will  not  likely be  shipped
at all since  the United  States  recently  shifted from  a net exporter
to  a net importer  of that  commodity.  Moreover,  procurement  for
Title II donated  commodities  was recently  suspended  for at least
two  months.  The  reason  is  our  uncertainty  over  U.S.  food
supplies.
If  the  low-income  nations  cannot  obtain  food  aid,  they  will
be  at  the  mercy  of prevailing  prices  on  the  world  market  and,
in times  of shortages,  they  will not be able  to afford  to  buy.
The short grain supplies and massive purchases  by the wealthy
nations  drove  prices  rapidly  upward  last  year and  frustrated  the
import plans of the developing nations like India.  One of the prob-
lems is the difficulty of anticipating  Soviet intentions and adjusting
production  accordingly.  Japan, too,  is a large customer;  but,  with
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needs.  Information about Soviet crop conditions, government bud-
gets, political directions,  and consumer prices  is very limited.  The
recent  U.S.-USSR agreement  for information  exchanges  on crop
conditions  and other agricultural  matters  may be useful,  but much
will likely  remain  unknown.
The Food and Agriculture  Organization  of the United Nations
recently  proposed  a world-sponsored  system  of "minimum  world
food security"  to protect the developing nations against low world
stocks and high prices.  FAO notes that, "Current national policies
for basic  stocks were not designed  to cope  with the present  situa-
tion.  Stocks are costly and governments  and commercial interests
have  to  weigh  the  financial  burdens  of stockholding  against  the
risks of a short  fall  in  supplies."  The FAO  proposal  involves an
international  cooperative  effort  to  maintain  emergency  stocks  of
foods.
The  FAO  Director-General  has  called an  emergency  meeting
of the major wheat exporters  to urge them to "ensure  that vulner-
able  developing  countries  are  able  to  obtain  . . . their minimum
essential  imports for human consumption to avoid acute hardship,
serious  social and political instability  and possible starvation  later
in the season."
Whatever  the outcome  of FAO's plans,  it is  sure  that, unless
the  nations  accept  responsibility  for  maintaining  contingency
stocks,  we  can  expect  a  continuation  of  a  dangerous  supply-
demand  balance  in  the  years  to  come.  The  bulk  of the  world's
grain  crop  is  grown  in  the  developed  nations,  most especially  in
the  North  American  continent.  A  severe  shortfall  in  production
in these  areas  would  likely  cause  dangerously  volatile  prices  all
over the world.  And  little could  be done  to combat  famine  in the
less developed  nations  when,  if,  and  where it occurs.
We have not resolved our question about aid and responsibility
to developing nations.  But the current shock of food prices, gener-
ated  by  short  supplies  and  the  domination  of the  world  market
by  wealthy  nations,  should  open  our  eyes  to  their needs.  These
needs  have  been  there  a  long  time  but  are  cruelly  brought  into
sharper focus  in  times  of food stress.
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